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The chronic scarcity of safe assets has been 
linked to a large list of macroeconomic illnesses. 
These range from Greenspan’s conundrum and 
the global imbalances of the mid 2000s, to the 
now endemic negative natural rates in most devel-
oped economies. In Caballero and Farhi (2014) 
and Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2015) we 
provide detailed models of the closed and open 
economy implications, respectively, of this scar-
city. In this short paper we present a highly styl-
ized model,  IS-LM/ Mundell-Fleming style, that 
captures some of the central mechanisms and 
implications described in those papers.
In a nutshell, in our model the  safe-asset mar-
ket equilibrium supplements the IS relationship 
and the Taylor Rule, to endogenously determine 
output, the interest rate, and the risk premium. 
A drop in the supply of safe assets reduces out-
put and increases the risk premium. The central 
bank can offset the output reduction by lower-
ing interest rates within a range. When the scar-
city of safe asset is acute, the zero lower bound (ZLB) becomes binding and the safe asset mar-
ket equilibrates via a reduction in output, akin 
to a liquidity trap, which we call a safety trap to 
emphasize its origins in the safe asset market.
In the open economy, the scarcity of safe 
assets spreads from one country to the other via 
the capital account. Net safe asset producers 
export these assets to net safe asset absorbers 
until interest rates are equalized across countries. 
As the global scarcity of safe assets intensifies, 
interest rates drop and capital flows increase 
to restore equilibrium in global and local safe 
asset markets. Once the ZLB is reached, out-
put becomes the adjustment variable again. The 
world economy enters a regime of increased 
interdependence as countries cannot use mon-
etary policy to insulate their economies from 
world capital flows.
The exchange rate becomes indeterminate, but 
plays a crucial role in both the distribution and 
the magnitude of the adjustment. Devaluations 
are  beggar-thy-neighbor. If the currency of the 
net safe asset producer country appreciates, it 
reduces the global scarcity of safe assets via 
valuation effects. However, this comes at a sig-
nificant output cost for the safe asset producing 
country. Policies that increase the net supply 
of safe assets somewhere are output enhancing 
everywhere. In contrast, policies that remove 
safe assets from the private sector to encourage 
 risk-taking do the opposite.
I. Closed Economy
Denote  y output,  r the risky expected real rate 
of return and  r s the safe real rate of return. The 
economy is stationary and prices are perma-
nently fixed so nominal and real rates of return 
coincide. The standard  IS-LM model considers 
the markets for goods and money (which implies 
that the market for perfectly substitutable bonds 
and loans clears by Walras’ Law). We assume 
instead that safe and risky assets are not perfect 
substitutes, and consider three markets: goods, 
money (or equivalently a Taylor rule), and safe 
assets, with the market for risky assets clearing 
by Walras’ Law. We place ourselves in the cash-
less limit and therefore ignore the money mar-
ket, except for the fact that it imposes a ZLB 
constraint. The economy is characterized by the 
following system:
(IS)  y −  y ̅= −δ (r −  r ̅) −  δ s ( r s −  r ̅s ) 
(TR)  r s =  max 
 
 
 ( r ̂s + ϕ (y −  y ̅) , 0) 
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(SA) s =  ψ y y +  ψ s  r s −  ψ Δ (r −  r s ) .
Equation (IS) characterizes the goods market 
equilibrium.  y ̅,  r ̅, and  r ̅s denote potential output 
and the natural risky and safe expected returns. 
We envision a situation where  δ s is small as the 
private sector has limited capacity to issue safe 
debt to fund its projects. Equation (TR) is a 
 Taylor-rule type relationship: monetary author-
ities set the nominal riskless interest rate in 
response to the output gap, where  r ̂ s is the target 
nominal interest rate. The monetary authority 
faces a ZLB: the safe interest rate cannot turn 
negative.
Equation (SA) is new. It represents equilib-
rium in the market for safe assets.  s denotes the 
supply of safe assets, considered exogenous here, 
and the right-hand side denotes the demand for 
safe assets. Both are gross, since safe assets are 
in zero net supply, issued by safe asset suppli-
ers to safe asset absorbers (there are no physical 
safe assets). A stock interpretation of equation (SA) is possible if safe asset absorbers allocate 
their wealth between money and safe assets, and 
the demand for the latter depends on the spread 
between safe assets and money  r s , the spread 
between risky and safe assets  r −  r s , and the 
liquidity services of safe assets which increase 
with output  y . Our preferred interpretation is in 
terms of flows, rather than stocks:  s is the net 
increase in the supply of safe assets, equal to the 
net increase in demand over a given period. This 
is the relevant interpretation since safe asset 
markets have a large share of “ buy-and-hold” 
private and public institutional investors driven 
in part by mandates and regulation. As a result, 
a large part of safe asset positions are essentially 
idle at high frequencies. In this context, demand 
increases with income  y and with the return on 
safe assets  r s (capturing rigid income allocation 
and reinvestment into safe assets), and decreases 
with the risk premium  r −  r s (capturing search 
for yield considerations).
The usual  IS-LM analysis obtains in the limit 
case  ψ Δ → ∞ , where the risk premium disap-
pears. We are interested in the opposite extreme, ψ Δ = 0 , where safe assets markets are unre-
sponsive to the risk premium. Going forward, 
we impose  ψ Δ = 0 . This specification of equa-
tion (SA) arises naturally in models with hetero-
geneity in risk preferences where a key driver 
of safe asset demand is the change in wealth 
of safe asset absorbers (which increases with 
y and  r s ) and where the supply of safe asset is 
unresponsive to current conditions because of 
various constraints on securitization (see, e.g., 
Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny  2012; Barro and 
Mollerus 2014; Caballero and Farhi 2014; and 
Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas 2015).
Away from the ZLB.—With  ψ Δ = 0 , the 
system  IS-TR-SA becomes recursive, with the 
last two equations determining the safe interest 
rate and equilibrium output, while the IS equa-
tion pins down the risk premium given these. 
Equilibrium outside the ZLB is represented in 
Figure 1, which illustrates the determination of 
output  y and the safe interest rate  r s from TR 
and SA.
Reductions in the target nominal interest 
rate  r ̂s shift the TR curve to the right, and result in 
a decrease in the safe interest rate  r s , an increase 
in output  y , and under reasonable parameter 
conditions ( δ s small enough) a decrease in the 
risky expected return  r . Similarly, reductions 
in the supply of safe assets  s shift the SA curve 
to the left and result in a decrease in the safe 
interest rate  r s , a reduction in output  y, and an 
increase in the risky expected return  r .
SA determines the natural interest rate con-
sistent with equilibrium in the safe asset market 
when output is at potential:  r ̅s =  (s −  ψ y  y ̅) / ψ s . 
Inspecting the system, the monetary authorities 
Figure 1. TR-SA Diagram for a Closed Economy
Notes: Outside the ZLB, output is at potential ( y ̅) and mon-
etary policy targets the natural safe rate ( r ̅s ) (point A). If the 
natural safe rate is negative (point B) because of excess safe 
asset demand, the economy is at the ZLB and output must 
fall (point C).
TR: r s=max(r s+ø(y−y),0)
SA: ψ yy=−ψ srs + s
SA′: ψ yy=−ψ srs + s ′
_
A
C
B
y0 y y
rs
r s
VOL. 106 NO. 5 515Safe aSSet Scarcity and aggregate demand
can achieve potential output,  y =  y ̅,  by  choosing 
a target rate equal to the natural interest rate, 
 r ̂s =  r ̅s , as long as  r ̅s ≥ 0. The risky expected 
rate of return is then at its natural value  r =  r ̅.
At the ZLB: The Safety Trap.—Suppose now 
that the supply of safe assets is low enough com-
pared to potential output ( s <  ψ y  y ̅) so that the 
natural interest rate is negative  r ̅s < 0 .
The monetary authorities must set  r s = 0 
and output is pinned down by the SA condition: 
 y = s/ ψ y <  y ̅. The risky expected return  r fol-
lows from the IS condition:
  r =  r ̅+  ( y ̅− y) ( ψ s −  δ s  ψ y ) (δ ψ s )  >  r ̅. 
That is, the risky expected rate of return  r and the 
risk premium  r −  r s endogenously increase with 
the depth of the recession. The economy enters 
a “safety trap” recession: equilibrium in the safe 
asset market is restored through a decline in out-
put rather than through a more benign reduction 
in interest rates.
II. Open Economy
Let’s now consider an economy with two 
countries, Home and Foreign. We write the 
home IS curve describing equilibrium in the 
goods market as
  y −  y ̅= −δ (r −  r ̅a ) −  δ s ( r s −  r ̅s, a ) 
 −  η y (y −  y ̅) +  η  y ∗  ( y ∗ −  y ̅∗ ) 
 −  η e (e −  e ̅a ) . 
The first two terms are as before and can be 
interpreted as domestic absorption.  r ̅a and  r ̅s, a 
are the home natural risky and safe expected 
rates of return of the economy under financial 
autarky. The last three terms reflect the trade 
balance components of domestic aggregate 
demand.  e is the nominal exchange rate (equal to 
the real exchange rate since prices are constant), 
with the convention that an increase in  e is an 
appreciation of the home currency. We assume 
the trade balance worsens with domestic output 
and the nominal exchange rate  e, and improves 
with foreign output  y ∗ where stars denote for-
eign variables. Finally,  e ̅a is the natural autarky 
exchange rate such that trade is balanced 
when home and foreign output are at potential ( y =  y ̅ and  y ∗ =  y ̅∗ ). A similar IS condi-
tion holds for the foreign country. We assume 
the two countries share the same coefficients 
 δ ∗ = δ ,  δ s ∗ =  δ s ,  ψ y ∗ =  ψ y , and  ψ s ∗ =  ψ s . 
Crucially, we allow for differences in natural 
variables  r ̅a∗ ,  r ̅s, a∗ , and  y ̅∗ .
A. Financial Autarky
Under financial autarky, the markets for safe 
assets clear separately in each country. Full 
employment can be achieved by setting target 
interest rates  r ̂s and  r ̂s∗ equal to the autarky nat-
ural safe interest rate  r ̅s, a and  r ̅s, a∗ , as long as 
the latter are positive. The risky expected returns 
and the exchange rate are then at their natural 
levels  r =  r ̅a ,  r ∗ =  r ̅a∗ , and  e =  e ̅a . 
If one or both natural safe rates are neg-
ative, one or both countries experiences a 
safety trap with  r s, a, i = 0 in country  i and 
output determined from the SA condition as: 
 y a, i =  s i / ψ y <  y ̅i . The risky rate in country  i 
can be expressed as:  r a, i =  r ̅a, i +  ( y ̅i −  y a, i ) × ( ψ s −  δ s ψ y ) / (δ ψ s ) >  r ̅a, i , and the risk pre-
mium increases with the depth of the home reces-
sion. Finally, the exchange rate  e a is such that 
trade is balanced:  − η y ( y a −  y ̅) +  η  y ∗  ( y a∗ −  y ̅∗ )   −  η e ( e a −  e ̅a ) = 0. The autarky exchange rate 
is more appreciated (depreciated) the more 
depressed is home (foreign) autarky output.
B. Financial Integration
Suppose now that financial markets are inte-
grated and that home and foreign risky assets 
are a perfect substitute, as are home and foreign 
safe assets. In steady state the exchange rate is 
constant so the return on risky and safe assets 
is equated across countries:  r =  r ∗ and  r s =  r s∗ .
Away from the ZLB.—Consider first the case 
where each country can achieve its potential out-
put. For a given exchange rate  e, the global safe 
asset market clearing condition takes the form
  se +  s ∗ = e ( ψ y  y ̅+  ψ s  r ̅s ) +  ( ψ y  y ̅∗ +  ψ s  r ̅s ) . 
It follows that  r ̅s is an exchange  rate-weighted 
average of the natural autarky safe returns, 
 r ̅s, a and  r ̅s, a∗ :  r ̅s (e) =  r ̅s, a e/ (e + 1) +  r ̅s, a∗ / (e + 1) , where  r ̅s (e) increases with  e when 
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Home is relatively abundant in safe assets, 
i.e.,  r ̅s, a >  r ̅s, a∗ . This is intuitive: If Home is rel-
atively abundant in safe assets, an appreciation 
of the home currency increases their net supply, 
pushing up the global safe yield. In that case, in 
the integrated equilibrium Home must be a net 
exporter of safe assets, i.e.,
 s  −  ψ y  y ̅−  ψ s  r ̅s (e) > 0 >  s ∗ −  ψ y  y ̅∗ −  ψ s r ̅s (e) . 
Substituting  r ̅s (e) into the Home and Foreign 
goods market condition and imposing that global 
trade is balanced, we can solve for  r ̅and  e ̅:
  r ̅=   e ̅ _ 
 e ̅ + 1  r ̅
a +  1 _ 
 e ̅ + 1  r ̅
a∗ 
  η e ( e ̅ −  e ̅a ) =  δ ( r ̅
a −  r ̅a∗ ) +  δ s ( r ̅s, a −  r ̅s, a∗ ) 
   ______________________ 
 e ̅ + 1 .
Like the equilibrium safe return, the equilib-
rium risky return is the exchange  rate-weighted 
average of the natural autarky risky returns. 
The exchange rate depends on Home’s relative 
abundance in risky assets ( r ̅a −  r ̅a∗ ) and in safe 
assets ( r ̅s, a −  r ̅s, a∗ ). If Home is sufficiently 
abundant in at least one of the two assets, then 
the exchange rate must appreciate in the inte-
grated equilibrium,  e ̅ >  e ̅a , and Home must run 
a trade deficit. This is intuitive: If Home is suffi-
ciently abundant in at least one of the two assets, 
it attracts net capital inflows, and its currency 
appreciates under integration.
Gross and net flows differ: a country could 
export safe assets ( r ̅s, a >  r ̅s, a∗ ) while running a 
trade surplus if  δ ( r ̅a −  r ̅a∗ ) +  δ s ( r ̅s, a −  r ̅s, a∗ ) < 0 , which could capture the situation of coun-
tries such as Switzerland or Germany nowadays.
Outside the ZLB, a decrease in the global 
supply of safe assets decreases the equilibrium 
return on safe assets  r ̅s (for  δ s small enough). 
The currency of the country whose safe asset 
supply decreases depreciates. Via valuation 
effects, this mitigates the initial decline in safe 
asset supply and helps restore equilibrium on the 
global market for these assets. The global risk 
premium  r ̅−  r ̅s increases and output remains 
unchanged.
At the ZLB: The Global Safety Trap.— 
Consider now what happens when the natural 
risk free rate  r ̅s ( e ̅) falls below zero . The ZLB 
 constraint requires  r s = 0 and the equilibrium 
conditions become
  (1 +  η y ) (y −  y ̅) = −δ (r −  r ̅a ) +  δ s r ̅s, a 
 +  η  y ∗  ( y ∗ −  y ̅∗ )  
 −  η e (e −  e ̅a ) ,
 (1 +  η  y ∗  ∗ ) ( y ∗ −  y ̅∗ ) = −δ (r −  r ̅a∗ ) 
 +  δ s  r ̅s, a∗ +  η y ∗(y −  y ̅) 
 +  η e ∗(e −  e ̅a ) ,
 e s +  s ∗ =  ψ y (e y +  y ∗ ) . 
This is a system of three equations in four 
unknowns ( y,  y ∗ ,  r,  e) , so there is a fundamen-
tal indeterminacy. In the global safety trap, total 
output needs to fall to equilibrate the market for 
safe assets, but it is indeterminate how much 
of this fall should occur at home or in foreign. 
The exchange rate pins down the distribution 
of output reductions, with a more depreciated 
exchange rate associated with a smaller output 
reduction at Home and a larger one in Foreign.
We can index these equilibria by the value 
of the exchange rate. To fix ideas, consider the 
case where both  r ̅s, a < 0 and  r ̅s, a∗ < 0 so that 
each country is in a safety trap under financial 
autarky. We can rewrite the equilibrium condi-
tions in deviation from autarky:
(1)  e  (y −  y a ) +  ( y ∗ −  y a∗ )  = 0
(2)  (y −  y a )  (1 +  η y +  η y ∗) 
       −  ( y ∗ −  y a∗ )  (1 +  η  y ∗  ∗ +  η  y ∗  ) 
= δ ( r a −  r a∗ ) −  ( η e +  η e ∗)  (e −  e a ) . 
Equation (1) says that home output can increase 
above its autarky level ( y >  y a ) only if foreign 
output decreases below it ( y ∗ <  y a∗ ). Equations (1) and (2) together imply that home (foreign) 
output decreases below (increases above) autarky 
when the exchange rate  e exceeds  e ̂ such that: 
 ( η e +  η e ∗) ( e ˆ −  e a )  = δ ( r a −  r a∗ ) . Figure 2 
illustrates graphically the role of the exchange 
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rate and the potential for currency wars. At point 
A,  e =  e ˆ and the global economy achieves the 
autarky levels of output  y =  y a and  y ∗ =  y a∗ . 
As the exchange rate depreciates below  e ˆ , 
schedule (1) rotates counterclockwise while 
schedule (2) shifts right: home output increases, 
foreign output decreases and home’s trade bal-
ance improves. For a sufficiently depreciated 
exchange rate, Home achieves potential output (point C) at which point it escapes the safety 
trap at the expense of the foreign country.
While outside the ZLB (in the limit  δ s ≈ 0 ) 
the scarcity of safe assets did not affect output, 
the exchange rate, or the trade balance, at the 
ZLB this is no longer true and the scarcity of 
safe assets depresses output globally, with the 
distribution of output reductions, and therefore 
trade balances, pinned down by the exchange 
rate.
III. Some Policy Remarks
In the safety trap world, any policy that 
expands safe asset supply anywhere has expan-
sionary effects everywhere and reduces risk 
premia. Public debt issuance is expansionary, 
to the extent that it is safe, and that future tax-
ation does not curtail the private sector’s abil-
ity to issue safe assets. The early quantitative 
easing programs swapping risky for safe assets 
belong to this category; so do policies that boost 
private  securitization capacity (bank recapital-
izations, support to securitization markets in 
the form of purchases of securitized products, 
etc.). Operation twist type policies that swap 
super safe (negative beta) long-term government 
bonds for safe (zero beta) short-term govern-
ment bonds or reserves do not belong, however, 
because they reduce the global supply of safe 
assets (see Caballero and Farhi 2014).
Fiscal stimulus anywhere (increases in gov-
ernment spending enter as positive aggregate 
demand shifters in the IS curves) also stimu-
lates output everywhere, but via its impact on 
safe assets rather than through the standard IS 
shift in the  IS-LM model. When fiscal stimulus 
is financed by taxes that do not reduce pledge-
able income and hence the private supply of 
safe assets, global output increases because of a 
reduction in safe asset demand at any givel level 
of output (increases in taxes reduce disposable 
income and act as negative safe asset demand 
shifters in the global SA curve). When fiscal 
stimulus is (safe) debt financed instead, global 
output increases because it corresponds to an 
increase in safe asset supply at any givel level of 
output as above. In both cases, there are oppos-
ing effects on risk premia from the increase 
in government spending net of taxes (which 
increases risk premia) and from the increase in 
global output (which lowers risk premia).
Exchange rate policies and capital account 
policies have negative spillovers and increase 
risk premia. The exchange rate is indetermi-
nate, but a big player (such as a central bank) 
can still, in principle, set the exchange rate at 
any desired level, thereby pinning down the 
equilibrium, by standing ready to exchange 
home for foreign currency at the target level in 
unlimited amounts. In this context, devaluations 
are  beggar-thy-neighbor, increasing output in 
the devaluing country and reducing it abroad. 
Similarly a net safe asset producer can be 
tempted to impose taxes on safe capital inflows, 
or even to close its capital account, in order to 
insulate its economy from the contractionary 
consequences of safe asset scarcity.
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